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JURY UNANIMITY: HISTORICAL ACCIDENT OR SAFEGUARD
OF THE ACCUSED?
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)
Petitioners were convicted of felonies before separate Oregon juries, each
of which returned a less than unanimous verdict 1 as authorized under Oregon
law.2 Petitioners claimed such a verdict violated their sixth amendment right
to trial by juryA After the Oregon court of appeals affirmed, 4 the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 5 and HELD, conviction in a state
court based on a less than unanimous jury verdict does not violate constitutional rights.6

As late as 1346 the majority verdict of a jury was accepted, but in 1367
jury unanimity became necessary in order to render a verdict.7 By the eighteenth century the requirement of jury unanimity became an established
feature of the common law.8 Various theories have been advanced to explain
why the unanimity requirement arose. One theory is that unanimity was required during the fourteenth century because the defendant was not surrounded with legal safeguards fostering fair and impartial trials and penalties
were harshY A second hypothesis is there could be only one correct view
of the facts, since the early jury spoke from its own knowledge.1 Finally,
it has been suggested that the unanimity requirement stemmed from the early
practice in trial by compurgation 1' of impanelling twelve jurors but allowing
additional jurors to join them until one party had twelve compurgators

1. In the case of two petitioners the jury vote was 11-1, while in the case of one
petitioner the vote was 10-2. 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972).
2. ORE. CONsT. art. I, §7 provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right to public trial by an impartial jury in the county in which the offense
shall have been committed . . . provided, however, that in the circuit court ten members of
the jury may render a verdict of guilty or not guilty, save and except a verdict of guilty
of first degree murder, which shall be found only by a unanimous verdict, and not otherwise ... "
3. The sixth amendment right to trial by jury is made applicable to the states by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155
(1968).
4. 1 Ore. App. 483, 462 P.2d 691 (1969).
5. 400 U.S. 901 (1970).
6. 406 U.S. at 404 (1972) (Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart, J.J., dissenting).
7. 1 W. HOLDWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 814 (7th ed. rev. 1956).
8. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 379 (Tucker ed. 1803). During the eighteenth century
the finding of unanimous verdicts was encouraged by several practices. In order to avoid
delay in reaching a verdict the jurors were kept without meat, drink, fire, or light until
they agreed unanimously. Furthermore, if the jurors did not reach a verdict before the
judges were to leave the town, they could be pulled in a cart from town to town
throughout the circuit until they agreed unanimously on guilt or innocence. Id. at 375-76.
9. Haralson, Unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases, 21 Miss. L.J. 185, 191 (1950).
10. T. PLUNKETT, A CONcISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 131 (5th ed. 1956).
11. This method of trial required the compurgators to swear to their belief in the
truth of their principal's assertion of innocence. 1 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 7, at 305.
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"voting" for his side.' 2 According to this theory as the function of the jury
changed to one of judging credibility, the practice of adding to the original
twelve was dropped but the requirement that twelve votes had to be obtained
to convict the accused was retained.' 3
The United States Constitution does not mention the requirement of
jury unanimity. 14 However, the sixth amendment as originally proposed would
have required unanimity. 15 Until recently the United States Supreme Court
had held that trial by jury included three essential elements: (1) the jury
should consist of twelve persons, (2) the trial should be in the presence of a
judge having the power to instruct the jury as to the law, and (3) the verdict
must be unanimous. 6 Jury unanimity is required by the procedural rules of
of criminal trials in both federal' 7 and Florida's courts. Recently, however,
the Florida supreme 'court approved a proposed revision of the Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure that would permit less than unanimous verdicts.' 9 The Florida constitution does not mention jury unanimity.2 0 Some
state constitutions expressly provide there can be no conviction except by a
unanimous verdict,2 ' while a few state constitutions expressly allow conviction
by less than a unanimous jury vote.2 2 In England the unanimity requirement

12. Ryan, Less than Unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 58 J. Cams. L.C. &
P.S. 212-13 (1967).
13. Id. at 213.
14. U.S. CONsr. art. 1II, §2: "The Trial of all Crimes ... shall be by Jury." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed...."
15. The proposal, as originally introduced by James Madison to the House of Representatives, stated: "The trial of all crimes . . . shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders
2 B. ScswARTz, THm
of the vicinage, with the requisite of unanimity for conviction .
BIL OF RIGHTS: A DOcUMENTARY HISTORY 1027 (1971).
16. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930).
17. FED. R. Cami. P. 31 (a).
18. FL. R. CaRIs P. 1.440: "No verdict may be rendered unless all of the trial jurors
concur in it."
19. The proposed revision, FLA. R. Cpmi. P. 3.440 (approved Oct. 16, 1972), states:
"No verdict may be rendered by a jury of six persons unless five of the trial jurors concur in it. No verdict may be rendered by a jury of twelve persons unless ten of the
trial jurors concur in it, provided, that the death penalty may be imposed only after a
verdict of guilty concurred in by all of the trial jurors."
20. FLA. CONsr. art. I, §22 provides: "The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all
and remain inviolate. The qualifications and the number of jurors, not fewer than six,
shall be fixed by law."
21. See, e.g., UTAH CONT. art. I, §10.
22. LA. CONsr. art. VII, §41 provides that nine of the twelve may render a verdict
in cases where the punishment must be hard labor. ORE. CONST. art. I, §11 provides that
ten members of the jury may render a verdict in all but first degree murder cases, in which
the verdict must be unanimous. IDAHO CONsr. art. I, §7 provides that 5/6 of the jury
may render a verdict for offenses below the grade of felony. MONT. CONST. art. III, §23 provides that 2/3 of the jury may render a verdict for offenses below the grade of felony.
OKLA. CONsr. art. 11, §19 provides that 3/4 of the jury may render a verdict for offenses
below the grade of felony.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss2/10

2

Hinson:
Jury Unanimity: Historical Accident or Safeguard of the Accused?
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. XXV

was recently abandoned by statutory enactment.23
In 1968 the Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana2 4 held the fourteenth
amendment guarantees the right to jury trial in all criminal cases that fall
within the sixth amendment's purview if tried in a federal court, -5 because
trial by jury in criminal cases is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice ....- 26 However, Duncan left unanswered the question of whether the
elements of the common law jury would be required in state jury trials.
The question was partially answered in Williams v. Florida27 wherein
the Court held the twelve-man jury was not a necessary element of a state
jury trial.2 8 The Court in Williams noted that fixing the size of the common
law jury at twelve was an "historical accident" 29 and was unrelated to the
purpose of the jury as a "safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." 30
In the instant case four members of the Court 3' utilized the Williams
rationale to conclude that the unanimity requirement does not materially
contribute to the jury's ability to exercise "the commonsense judgment of
a group of laymen .... ."32 The Court also rejected petitioners' contention
that the sixth amendment should be held to require a unanimous jury verdict
in order to give substance to the reasonable doubt standard 3 as delineated
by the Court in In re Winship.34 The reasonable doubt standard maintains
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime charged.3 5 However, because the standard was based not on the sixth but on the fourteenth amend
ment,3 6 the Court held the sixth amendment itself does not require proof

beyond a reasonable doubt37
In addition, in Johnson v. Louisiana,3 8 decided the same day as the
principal case, the Court rejected the contention that jury unanimity should
23.

Criminal Justice Act §13 (1967).

24. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
25. Trial by jury is required in all cases in which the possible penalty exceeds six
months imprisonment. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1970).
26. Duncan v. Louisiana, 891 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
27. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
28. Id. at 86.
29. Id. at 89.
30. Id. at 100, quoting from Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
31. Chief Justice Berger, Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and White.
82. 406 U.S. at 410, quoting from Williams v. Florida, 899 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). Justice
Powell concurring in Apodaca v. Oregon concluded that the standard of due process would
be served as well by a jury verdict of ten out of twelve as by a unanimous verdict. 406
U.S. at 374.
33. 406 U.S. at 411-12.
34. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
35. Id. at 364.
56. Id.
87. 406 U.S. at 412 (1972).
38. 406 U.S. 856 (1972). This case upheld the conviction of appellant for armed
robbery on the basis of a 9-3 jury verdict, as authorized by LA. CONsr. art. VII, §41.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1973

3

19731

Florida Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 10
CASE COMMENTS

be required in order to give substance to the reasonable doubt standard mandated by the fourteenth amendment. 39 The appellant in Johnson had conceded that the sixth amendment was not applicable to his case, since Duncan
is not retroactive.40 Earlier a lower federal court had stated there could not
be a verdict supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt if one or more of
of the jurors remained in doubt as to guilt.41 However, commentators have
pointed out that it is necessary to distinguish between convincing an individual juror and the necessity of convincing the jury as a body of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.2 This distinction is necessary because the defendant is not acquitted but is merely given a new trial when the jury cannot
agree unanimously upon a verdict. 43 The Supreme Court utilized the latter
rationale in Johnson, holding that lack of jury unanimity is not to be equated
44
with the existence of a reasonable doubt.
The instant Court also refused to accept the contention that a rule permitting less than unanimous verdicts would violate the requirement that jury
panels reflect a cross section of the community- 5 because conviction could
occur without the acquiescence of minority elements. 41 It has been held repeatedly that the Constitution only forbids systematic exclusion of minority
groups from jury panels. 47 In the principal case the Court stated no identifiable
segment has the right to block convictions; it only has the right to participate
in the over-all judicial process. 48
The result of the instant case is that unanimous jury verdicts are not
required in state criminal trials but are constitutionally required in federal
criminal trials.49 Although Justice Powell stipulated that the sixth amendment requires a unanimous jury verdictr o he contended that due process does
not require incorporation in the fourteenth amendment "jot-for-jot and
case-for-case"' 51 every element of the sixth amendment.52 The result is that
the states are required to apply a "watered-down, subjective version of the

39. Id. at 362.
40. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633 (1968).
41. Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834, 838 (6th Cir. 1953). "The unanimity of a

verdict in a criminal case is inextricably interwoven with the required measure of proof." Id.
42. See Comment, Waiver of Jury Unanimity- Some Doubts About Reasonable Doubt,
21 U. Cm. L. RLv. 438, 441 (1954).

43. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
44. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363 (1972).
45. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 636 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring
opinion); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 549-50 (1967); Smith v. Texas, 311 US. 128, 130

(1940); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
46. 406 U.S. at 412-14 (1972).
47. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965); Cassell v. Texas, 339 Us. 282,
287 (1950); Aikens v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945).
48. 406 U.S. at 413 (1972).
49. A majority of the Court (Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, Powell, and Stewart, JJ.),
agreed that the sixth amendment requires a unanimous verdict in federal criminal trials.

50. 406 U.S. at 391.
51. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion).
52. 406 U.S. at 375.
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individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights." 53 This clearly departs from the
prevailing view that once a provision of the Bill of Rights is found to apply
to the states identical standards are applied to the state and federal govern5 4

ments.

Although proposals for non-unanimous jury verdicts have generally been
received with approval,55 a recent study 56 indicates that deadlocked juries are
primarily the product of difficulties in the case and not the product of a lone
corrupt juror. 5 The study concludes that fifty-six per cent of deadlocked
juries contain either one, two, or three dissenters. 58 In these cases the majorities favor conviction in forty-four per cent and favor no conviction in
only twelve per cent of the samples. 59 Additionally, the study indicates that
if allowed to return a majority verdict the jury simply stops deliberating
after reaching the requisite majority.60 This raises serious questions concerning the jury's function in light of the court's view in Williams that the
number of jurors should be large enough to "promote group deliberation.""'
On the average, the frequency of deadlocked juries is 5.6 per cent in
states with a unanimity requirement 6 - and 3.1 per cent in states allowing
majority verdicts.6 3 Therefore, the elimination of the unanimity requirement
would transform about 2.5 in every 100 cases from deadlocked juries into
verdicts. In Florida a special count from the Miami circuit court showed
that among trials held before six-man juries the proportion of deadlocked
juries was only 2.5 per cent.6 4 Thus, in Florida the elimination of the un-

animity requirement should change the result in only a small percentage of
cases. The elimination of this small burden is not justified by the abolition
of the requirement of jury unanimity.65

53, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964), quoting from Ohio ex rel. Eaton v.
Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
54. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (fifth amendment); Klopfer
v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
55. See, e.g., ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY §1.1 (Approved Draft 1968); ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§335 (1931).
Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury - Notes for an English Controversy, 48 CI. B.
KALVAN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
57. Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 56, at 201.
58. Id. at 200.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 201. In Oregon under the majority verdict rule, the number of non-unanimous verdicts reached 25%. Id.
61. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
62. Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 56, at 200.
63. Id.
64. Zeisel, The Waning of the American Jury, 58 A.B.A.J. 367, 369 (1972).
65. In addition, the instant case does not clearly indicate that Florida could constitutionally adopt a 5-1 jury verdict. Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment, stated:
"Approval of Oregon's 10-2 requirement does not compel acceptance of all other majority
verdict alternatives. Due process and its mandate of basic fairness often require the drawing
of difficult lines." 406 U.S. at 377 n.21 (1972).
56.

REcORD 195 (1967). See also H.
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The jury is one of the most important safeguards in our scheme of
criminal justice. In light of the rationales of Williams and the instant case,
one wonders whether the Court eventually would accept a verdict based upon
a jury vote of 2-1. If the common law jury continues to be modified to deprive the defendant of peer-group safeguards, the necessity of any jury at all
is questioned. Despite approval by the Florida supreme court of a revised rule
of criminal procedure that would allow less than unanimous verdicts in criminal trials,* the legislature should refuse to permit the abolition of a rule that
safeguards the accused merely because the rule arose in the Middle Ages. The
legislature should exercise its power to repeal a rule allowing conviction by
6
less than unanimous jury vote. 6
LYNN JAMES HINSON

*EDrroR's Nom: At the time this comment was written the Florida supreme court
had approved a revision of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, which incorporated
a rule authorizing conviction by less than unanimous jury vote in certain cases. However,
the court subsequently approved a revision of the rules, which required conviction by
unanimous jury vote in all criminal cases. This subsequent revision became effective February 1, 1973.
66. FLA. CONST. art. V, §2 (a) provides that rules adopted by the supreme court for the
practice and procedure in all courts may be repealed by general law enacted by two-thirds
vote of the membership of each house of the legislature.
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